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BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION OF TIE LOBBY
The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States secures for
the people the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
In the earliest days of the Republic the right to petition had a very broad
meaning which lasted until the passage of the Tariff Act of 1789.
It is common knowledge that lobbying is as old as legislation, and that
pressure groups are as old as politics. As a result of our constitutional form
of government lobbying has become an integral part of our governmental process.
Finer has said, "It is clear that the lobby in its American form and efficiacy
is a direct product of American Condition." In the days when the activities
of the government were narrow and the economics of the nation relatively small,
the use of petition to Congress was a tool for acquiring justice in individual,
isolated cases. With the expansion of the economy, economic specialization has
developed, and with it has brought conditions favorable to the development of
an extremely large number, and wide variety, of organized groups interested in
bringing their weight to bear on public policy. The presence of the "pressure
groups" has been recognized since the beginning of the nation but the greatest
growth has been since the end of World War I. These groups have arisen as in-
dividuals felt the need for some formal, organized way of expressing their
Herman Finer, Theory and Practice^ of Modern Government (New York:
Mc-Graw-Hill, 1950), p. 462.
"

2demands in the discussion of Public Policy. The broadening scope of governmen-
tal control of private activity has lent impetus to the growth. Any regulatory
or taxing effort on the part of the government is bound to cause those effected
to group together to protect their interests. The broader and more pervasive
governmental control becomes, the greater is the likelihood that any particular
group will have such common interests to protect.
These then are the principal reasons for the growth of pressure groups
in the United States. In this paper we are primarily concerned with the study
of one of the principal tools of the pressure group: the lobby, its place in
the federal government, and its control.
Members of Congress seldom introduce bills on their own initiative.
Bills are introduced at the request of patriotic organizations, individuals,
social groups, and very often economic groups. Many organizations, some of
them very powerful, maintain agents in Washington, whose business it is to
secure favorable legislative action upon measures advocated by their group and
accomplish the defeat or deferring of bills to which they are opposed. This
business, sometimes thought of as an "art," is called "lobbying" and those who
are engaged in it are called "lobbyists." We have already noted the reasons
for the growth of the pressure groups; e.g., extension of national government
power over important social and economic matters. For many of these same
reasons the lobby has broadened its own activities and refined its processes.
Many students of government find in the lobbyists' activities the per-
formance of a needed function. Representation in the Congress is geographical.
A member of the Senate or the House represents an area, and not, unless his
region is remarkably homogeneous economically, a functional or economic interest
group. Bonds that tie people together today are economic as well as geographic.

3A congressman may well represent his local area generally, but he may be unable
to represent the more important economic interest groups. The lobby can serve
to provide this needed "functional representation." It promotes the individual's
or minority group's actual interest in the halls of government in a way which
is impossible for geographically selected representatives. In the minds of
many, the Lobby has become the "Third House" of Congress. In this "Third House"
the balance of competing interests is fought and decided. The lobby serves to
express the mixture of public opinion that is held by the minority groups
throughout the nation. Representation la the lobby is social or economic,
usually the latter, and much more direct than in the regularly established
houses. Competition for the promotion of favorite causes is severe and ener-
getic in the "Third House." No bill that is the least controversial arises
that is not supported by one group and attacked by another. In this conflict
which produces policy the various lobbyists combine and divide readily accord-
ing to their views on various questions. The two constitutional houses repre-
sent the great unorganized public, which has only hazy and conflicting notions
of what it wants, whereas the lobbyists, informally, but often very success-
fully, represent interests that know exactly what they want, by placing pressure
on Congressmen.
Many lobbies were founded and are maintained partially because those
people behind a lobby feel that popular "electoral" action every few years is
insufficient to direct the activities of the federal government in the di-
rection that the group feels is proper. As a rule these groups feel that the
government does not know enough about their particular circumstances to treat
them fairly. They take the attitude th3t in order to provide equity, they must
inform the government representatives of the number of people who will be

4effected, and those people's opinions on proposed legislation. They feel that
they must provide them with the factual and justifying foundations and con-
sequences of their claims. The purposes or objectives of lobbies concern not
only internal domestic policy but foreign relations affecting peace, and
justice and general welfare on a world wide basis. The lobbies have refined
all. the technical devices necessary to their operations, and have become expert
on the sources and channels of administrative and legislative power. They
gather together the aims, desires and impulse of a coherent mass of people.
Lobbies have come into a public and well recognized position because of the
growing realization that political parties in a country so vast as the United
States do not properly represent the many diverse purposes of the people.
This lack of representation springs from the political parties themselves.
What in other countries is accomplished by the partial dissolution or blending
of interests in the political parties and the legislature is accomplished in
the United States by two organizations which are almost mutually exclusive, the
political party and the lobby. The political parties apparently are fully
occupied trying to cope with the obstacles and separations inherent to
American politics. They seem to have very little time or energy remaining for
other activities, .'s a result the lobby has taken a place, a very prominent
one, in the picture. As a result, one writer has said, "the lobby is the
necessary adjunct to the American party system for it makes the policy while
the parties are necessarily occupied with other functions. They have been so
fully recognized that they are freely admitted to the councils and committees




Lobby history in the United States may be divided into two distinct eras,
that of the "old lobby" and the "new." Roughly defined the "old lobby" may be
considered to have had its days of glory from the middle fifties in the last
century until the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. This so
called "old lobby" was a thing of fascination. It provided corruption and dis-
honesty within the federal government almost beyond belief. In almost all
cases during the period the lobbyist was either the creature of some special
commercial interest seeking support from the public treasury or else a profess-
ional who acted as an agent for persons having private claims against the
government. As a rule the methods used in either case were underhanded and
generally corrupt. It is well known that in many instances women were employed
to cooperate with the regular lobbyists in pressuring the legislators. The
general attitude toward the lobbyist in those days was one of contempt. The
word "lobbyist" was a term of opprobrium, and very justly so. People were
extremely reticent to be known as lobbyists. Even today with the capitol
swarming with lobbyists, it is most difficult to discover one. A searcher may
encounter legislative agents, executive secretaries, special counsels, research
secretaries, and public relations councilors, but very seldom is an acknowledged
lobbyist seen. In 1913 when lobbying had improved its stature somewhat a
House committee declared, "The word (lobbyist) at one period carried with it a
certain idea of acts, sinister and corrupt, and the first impression now made
upon the mind of the average man when this word is used in connection with
legislative bodies is probably in line with this conception." Concerning the
U. S. Congress, House, Report on Charges Against Members of the House
and Lobbying Activities .. H. R. Report 113, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1913), p. 15.

6general feelings of the public toward lobbyists of the earlier period one
observer said, "I asked for an explanation and soon learned that the Third
House 1 consisted of old ex-members of either House or Senate, broken down
politicans, professional bores, and other vagrants who had made themselves
familiar with the modus operandi of legislation, and who negotiated for the
votes of members on terms to be agreed upon by the contracting parties—in short
these were the lobby members of the legislature, a portion of mankind which I
had never heard mentioned in terms other than those of contempt and disgust.**
The type of lobbyist alluded to was well financed, free spending and skillful
at getting what he wanted. His tools were comfort, good food, sometimes an
outright bribe, and the provision of feminine companionship for the harassed
legislator. In addition to this type of agent, there were polished representa-
tives of the great financial and economic interests on the national scene. In-
stead of relying entirely upon the lobbyist, the great national financial groups
found that splendid results could be obtained by recruiting directly members of
the House and Senate. There were legislators who represented most of the large
interests from meat to railroads. Fortunately this type of abuse has decreased
tremendously. The legislators of today can seldom be listed as the definite
spokesmen for some particular corporation or interest.
Early in the twentieth century a very noticeable change took place in
lobbying activities. The Washington offices of the associations, boards,
leagues and institutes, organised on a nationwide scale, formed the great
lobbies in the capital. During this period the representatives of corporations,
4
E. Pendleton Herring, Group Representation Before Congres s (Baltimore:
John Hopkins Press, 1929), p. 35, quoting "Experiences in the Lobby,"
Continental Monthly
. Ill (June, 1663), 688.

7patronage -brokers, "wire-pullers," and like ilk faded from predominance. These
group representatives took the ear of Congressmen and were paid proper atten-
tion. The groups worked out in the open; felt they had nothing to hide; knew
exactly what they wanted and the best way to go about getting it. They became
the assistant rulers or "invisible" government. They discarded the wine,
women, and song approach to Congress and replaced it with precision work and
efficiency. There were various significant causes which brought about this
change, some of which should be noted.
Some of the severest blows dealt the "old lobby" were delivered by the
Congress itself. The adoption of new rules of procedure in the House of
Representatives in 1911, broke up the "clique in power" type domination, and
the process of lobbyist control by bribery and cajolery was weakened. When
the Congress decided to hold open hearings on all important bills, at which
proponents and opponents might state their views publicly, the lobbyist
suffered another major setback. By testifying openly before the committees,
the lobbyists of legitimate interests could make their appeals to the public
as well as to the Congress. The openess of legitimate interests forced the
questionable lobbyist to :.opt the same tactics. Nc longer could he hope to
have important questions decided in passageways or hotel rooms. The general
public could now understand and evaluate (to some degree) the forces for or
against most legislation.
Prior to 1913, it was no great task for the great financial interests in
any state to get their candidates elected to the Senate by coercing the state
legislatures. As a result the Senate was regarded as the guardian of special
privilege. The elected lobbyists were extremely valuable as inside agents.
The passage of the Seventeenth Amendment eliminated much of this weakness. Today

8very seldom do you hear of a legislator being elected as the tool of some
definite special interest. One authority, however, stated, as late as 1950,
that "Every interest has a sympathizer in the seat of power, and he forms the
permanent open door for successful prosecution of the special claims to
accomodation in the law and its administration.
The above reforms in government had far reaching effects beyond the
Halls of Government. There arose a more intelligent and keener public aware-
ness and scrutiny of the affairs of government. The clamor and turmoil
necessary to bring about the legisl tive reforms stirred up the public interest
and centered the eyes of the nation upon the Congress. With the direct primary
and elections the people had a new control over their elected servants. No
longer were men elected and reelected who showed nothing more than a half-
hearteu interest in the desires of their constituents. A great deal of reform
legislation was passed, and much of it was concerned with the relations between
the government and private business interests. The action on the part of the
government that had the most direct effect upon the reform of the Lobby System
came in 1913. This was an extensive investigation carried on by both a House
and Senate Committee as to the maintenance of a lobby to defeat the passage of
the Underwood Tariff Bill. This inquiry was stimulated by President t'Jilson
and was thoroughly aired in the newspapers and periodicals throughout the
nation. The investigation projected a good deal of light on the activities and
methods of the Washington Lobbyists. The investigation did not accomplish all
that might be desired, but it is important for one principal reason. This in-
Finer, op. cit .. p. 460.
A.
U. S. Congress, House, Hearings before Judiciary Committee, 63rd Cong.,
2d Sess., March 17-24, 1914 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1914).

9vestigation and its results constitutes the first official expression on the
part of Congress concerning the status of the lobbies. The report clarified
the situation and set forth what was regarded as a new code of practice for the
subsequent activities of these organizations.
The investigations did not do away with the lobbies, indeed, it had no
desire to do so. It did call public attention to them and indicate in some
measure the changing methods of persuasion being employed. One student of this
period remarked, "Coercion through propaganda and the artificial creation of
opinion were recognized as the new weapons. Moreover, it was shown that the
bribery that had disgraced legislative bodies in the past was not the instrument
of the modern lobby. In this sense the investigation of 1913 marked the close
of an era in the history of the lobby."
In the years since 1913, a completely new lobby system has developed in
the United States. This is not to say that the poor repute of lobbyists has
been eliminated from all Congressional and newspaper descriptions of lobbies,
but some of this prior ill repute has been alleviated by the present day openess
of the lobby members. The organizers and negotiators in today's lobbies are
those people with a special knowledge of the channels of legislation and the
operations of the Congress. Some lobbyists are men of high standing in the
legal profession. They are capable of presenting to the committees or individ-
ual members of Congress the various aspects of proposed legislation that is of
interest to their clients, and they can do this in a convincing and thoroughly
plausible manner. Many authors feel that the higher types of lobbyists are
equal to the Legislators, if not superior, in ability and stature, not to mention





financially. Among the many types of lobbyists are the ex-members of Congress
These ex-solons are hired for a variety of reasons. Sometimes it is because
they have a particular interest in and knowledge of the business they represent,
but more often they are hired in the expectation that they will make use of
their knowledge of Congressional procedures and their associations and friend-
ships with the present members of Congress. In late years the ranks of the
lobbyists have swollen with an influx of former journalists. Very often these
journalists have exceptional success as lobbyists because they are skilled in
the use of the press for establishing a public opinion for or against an issua
Many of the lobby members are selected because they lave an expert knowledge
of the matters they are to present to the lawmakers. Regardless of his previous
positions, the average successful lobbyist is a man of better than average
ability. This excludes some very obvious frauds who are easily found out.
Concerning the better qualified lobbyist, one writer in the field said "the
expert lobbyist is a master in tht intricacies of Congressional procedure. His
complete knowledge of procedure makes him a legislative strategist of the
highest order. He knows when to attack and when to withdraw; when to take the
citadel by storm and when to settle down to a long siege. He knows the Repre-
sentatives and Senators, their moral and political strength, their ambitions,
their mental processes, and he uses this knowledge skillfully, sometimes too
skillfully for the public good."9
It is generally agreed by most current day authors that offers of direct
bribes to legislators by lobbyists are few and far between. This was a favored
tool of the "old lobby," but has limited potential at present. There is reason
to believe that in some instances lobbyists offer future positions in business




to legislators who manage to see a particular point of view, but even this belief
is not as widely held as it was twenty or thirty years ago. In order to be
successful the lobbyist must first get the legislator to listen to what he has
to say. In order to accomplish this purpose on a personal basis the Lobbyist
makes use of his greatest personal attribute; his expert ability. His greatest
personal strength lies in the fact that he knows infinitely more, as a general
rule, about the matter he is trying to affect than does the average lawmaker.
In such cases it is the part of wisdom for the legislator to make use of this
technically qualified information. Lawmakers of the very highest order have
testified repeatedly to the expert abilities of various lobbyists. It is
accepted as natural that even the most honestly motivated lawmaker, after making
allowances for the special interest aims of these experts, should be impressed
and perhaps influenced by the arguments, documents, and other materials pre-
sented by these experts.
It would be a serious misconception to think that the success of the
lobbyist is based solely on his expert knowledge. Nothing could be further
from reality. Most lobbyists are the Washington representatives for powerful
economic or social organizations. Very often these organizations contribute
handsomely to party "war chest" funds, or to the campaign funds of individual
candidates. Some of these same groups control or exert an influence on many
thousands of organized votes. It is well recognized that in some district where
their strength is heavily concentrated they can easily make or break a legis-
lator, or would-be legislator. It is for this reason that legislators from
areas strongly manned with a certain type of economic interest cannot ignore
the interest's lobby agent with impunity, but rather must treat these lobbyists
with some deference. A legislator who shows little interest in the counsels of
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the interest's lobbyist may be sure of receiving certain attentions from the
home district. When the lobbyist reports back that the Congressman's attitude
is lacking, the harassed legislator finds himself flooded with telegrams,
letters, and phone calls, all devoted to showing him the error of his ways and
pointing out the possible dire consequences of his attitude. Rare is the
congressman who is never threatened by the power of the lobbies. Fear cf being
voted out of office may cause the beleagured congressman to view certain matters
in the same light in which the lobbyist views them.
The lobbies that are active in Washington ean be roughly divided into
four groups. The first of these groups is the permanent group organization
for which lobbying is only one activity out of many. The National Association
of Manufacturers, or the Association of American Railroads provide two examples
of this type lobby. The second type of lobby includes the dozens which promote
causes that reflect the interests of their members in principles and programs
which may have no direct bearing on the livelihood of the members. Some of
these are the pro-war and anti-war groups, the Birth Control Federation of
America, or the National Child Labor Committee. The third principal type is
that devoted to special projects, rather than a continuing campaign. These
groups exist only for a limited time; until they succeed or fail in their
mission. They serve an excellent purpose in that they bring to light certain
issues that would normally get very limited attention.
The fourth type of lobby is represented by the Federal Government. The
government itself now maintains the biggest and possibly the most active lobby
of all. This federal lobby is best described as a "two-way" lobby, in that it
operates on the Congress and on the Public. Some critics of this lobby have
maintained that the agencies of government "out-lobby" the lobbyists. Generally

this is regarded as a result of the tremendous powers acquired by the federal
government, including the money powers, spending powers and the extensive
regulatory authority of the Executive and the Agencies. It is no secret that
government agencies send aloft Htrial-bal loons'* in order to determine public
sentiment on any of a number of issues. If the reaction is the least bit
encouraging from the agencies' point of view, a propaganda campaign is launched.
In an effort to condition public opinion, the agencies may make use of quantities
of press releases, radio and television broadcasts, and pamphlets and brochures.
The intended result of these efforts is that government initiated and stimulated
public opinion will convince the Congress that the public wants, and demands,
that certain things be done. One Washington observer feels that these agency
pressures are not sporadic efforts, but heavy and constant, and stated, "Every
department has its 'liaison men' who work constantly on Capitol Hill. Reluctai t
Congressmen are whipped into line by promises of appointments for themselves or
friends, by withholding use of public money in their districts, or threats of
campaigning against them in the next election." l The lobbying by federal
agencies as such has never been encouraged nor condoned and in the strict
sense of the word is illegal. The semi-lobbying conduct of the departments
before the congress has been considered as proper, within limitations. The
departments are generally expected to refrain from many of the tactics and
strategems employed by civilian organizations. Whether such expectations are
realistic is another question. Albert Lepawsky has stated, "Governmental or
administrative lobbying is sometimes frowned upon, but the administrator and
his staff who will not, with discretion, do their share may soon find them-
10




selves without anything to administer. H This subject cannot be fully explored
in this paper, but it is safe to say that there is no indication that the
agencies intend to cease their efforts, nor that it would be prudent to do so.
As a combat patrol scouts and probes an enemy position for the best
avenue of attack, pressure groups search for the sector of government that is
least likely to resist their efforts. It is in the legislative branch of our
democratic government that this point of least resistance is found. Congress,
as one of the authors of overall national policy, is extremely vulnerable to
the attacks of organized minority interests. In times of very sharp political
conflict, the Houses of Congress become the maneuver areas for mobilized pressure
groups.
There must be no misconception that these groups operate only through
the legislative bodies. There are administrative agencies which have been known
for their close kinship with organized interests, which affect appointments,
policy making, and policy execution. Nor can it be said that the President
(the other author of National Policy) can be totally oblivious to pressures
from interests. As another elected representative he must take cognizance of
the interest groups. The difference between the President's position and that
of Congress is one of degree. The President is dependent upon the support of
the majority of the nation, and thusly can judge the various groups with a
degree of objectivity and perspective. The Congressman on the other hand is
elected and judged by small concentrated groups, and is both unable and un-
willing to withstand the demands of organized minorities.
It is obvious that the President and the Congress will and do react
Albert Lepawsky, Administration (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949),
p. 53.

1differently to the actions of pressure groups. The reasons are equally obvious.
Organized minorities will always have a far more significant role in Congress-
ional elections than they do in r residential. In the election of Congressmen
the public issues are usually less well defined, and national problems receive
less emphasis. In these circumstances the purely local issues become the
central question and the organized voters exercise relatively greater weight.
Presidential elections raise questions that are above the petty demands of
small groups. The presidential candidates naturally listen to the appeals of
the minority but they do so without the fear that a minority can make their
claims a campaign issue. Any such attempt would be smashed by the majority
of the voters who would deny the right of any minority to press their claims
on a national election level. This then is the difference between the
relationship of the President to the minority, and the relationship of Congress
to the special interests.

CHAPTER II
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE NEW LOBBY SYSTEM
Regardless of the interests of the particular groups, the lobbying
procedures employed are usually very similar, with some exceptions occuring in
the Lobbying done by government agencies. In all cases the major part of
lobbying is done "back home," in the "grass roots." It is carried on through
various interested groups in the home districts, especially in the home dis-
tricts of congressmen who are in a position to help or hurt the cause. The
stronger the support from back home for any lobby cause, the easier is the
work of the lobbyist encamped in Washington.
There are various manifestations of the grass root lobbying activities.
The delegations of voters which converge on the Capitol are usually the product
of coordinated lobbying activities. At times these delegations take the form
of "marches," as was the case with the soldier's bonus groups, or the anti-war
groups. Very often the action takes the form of witnesses who appear before
committees; groups that call upon individual congressmen; or possibly staged
demonstratuions. No matter what form the action takes, there is always a key
group stationed in Washington which directs and coordinates the maneuvers.
The mass crusade technique is mostly employed by the "cause" lobbies, and are
most effectively exploited by women. These manuevers are generally avoided by
the large national organizations, who have more subtle and less publicized meas
of attaining their objectives.




objective in Congress are a study in energy and determination. The process of
seeing a bill through congress calls for a wide variety of tactics, but there
is a familiar, often repeated pattern that is followed in many lobbying
campaigns.
When a lobbyist has certain ends that can be best attained through
formal legislation, he first makes certain that he has mustered all possible
"home" support. When he is sure of this support the agent next seeks out a
legislator to introduce a bill. It is at this stage that the lobbyist first
shows his skill: selecting the right legislator for the job. He looks for a
man who has at least one of several favorable attributes. He should be either:
a Representative of the region to be effected by the bill; a favorite of the
administration currently in power, an ardent and vigorous campaigner who is
also a skilled strategist in maneuvering legislation through the intricate
channels of Congress; or a member of an important committee, preferably the one
which will have jurisdiction over the bill. When this selected congressman
willingly identifies himself with a special interest, and has shown himself to
be in sympathy with the cause there is no problem presented. There are times
however, due to the nature of the desired legislation, or other causes, that
one particular congressman is desirable, if not essential. If this needed
Congressman is not sympathetic he must be shown the error of his ways through
persuasion. This persuasion usually takes two forms; technical argument is
the first of these; and the other is a thinly veiled threat that since he
misrepresents public opinion, the holders of that opinion will retaliate at a
future election date. The technical argument approach is effective and has
two principal values. It is in itself usually based in sound logic, and secondly
it provides the legislator with expert information to be used in the campaign,
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with little or no effort on his part. At the present time legislators are so
deluged with information proffered by interests of all kinds that one of the
earliest evils of lobbying is again present; namely, the solicitous interests
are too numerous for the congressman's time and legislative capacity. In such
circumstances the congressman must pick and choose among the many issues and
champion those he feels most worth his efforts. His motives for espousing
various alternatives are often difficult to determine. It is safe to say that
in many instances there flashes through his mind the fact that the active
groups may be small, but that they are more effective electoral ly than the
apathetic mass, and that unless they are placated they may seriously effect his
future in public life.
Having gotten the best man available for the job the lobbyist now faces
what might best be called a "problem of timing." The agent will take the
greatest pains to see that the bill is introduced at the time that will afford
the best publicity. The introductory speech is formed around the information
that the lobbyist provides for the lawmaker, and in many cases the speech is
written entirely by the lobby member. When his bill has been introduced the
lobbyist goes into his most active role—manipulator. It is not uncommon that
several committees will claim jurisdiction over a proposed piece of legislation.
When this happens the lobbyist strives to get it before the committee he feels
is most favorable to his cause. The campaign then goes into one of its most
critical phases; obtaining a favorable report from the committee. As a rule,
the Committee's first step is to seek an advisory opinion from the executive
department that would have charge of administering this legislation if it
became law. The lobbyist usually does all he can to see that the departmental
attitude is favorable. One generally accepted precept of lobbying is that every
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lobbyist should enlist the aid of one or more important government agencies.
A lobbyist can get invaluable assistance from an agency if he chooses his
agency and methods with care.
The most important opportunity provided the lobbyist to accomplish his
ends is furnished in the hearings before the Committee. Decisions on bills
are largely made in the committee rooms, not in full House assembly. It is
the practice and custom to take evidence from any interests concerned with the
bill who desire to testify. The lobbyist puts written and printed material
before the committee, and selects and sends before the committee the most expert
witnesses available. At these hearings the congressmen are able to sift the
evidence and to guess at the truth about the public support alleged by the
lobby, and to give weight to the evidence in proportion to its authenticity.
When the hearings are terminated, the lobbyist employs whatever influence he
can muster to see that the committee reports the bill favorably to the floor
of the House. In many cases the lobbyist provides assistance in the actual
drafting of the committee report. This report and the record of the Hearings
on which it is based are extremely important for they serve as a source of
information for members of the Congress, and may be consulted by the Supreme
Court, if, at a future date, it is necessary to determine the intent of Congress.
If, when the bill is reported to the House, the lobby can exert pressure
on the rules committee, the bill may get quick consideration. At this stage
the lobby goes to work on all the members of the House. An appraisal of the
favorable legislators and the opposing will serve to focus the attention of
the lobby on the undecided members or the weakly negative. If the tactics
of the lobby are successfull, and the bill is passed in the House, the lobbyist
then goes through a very similar procedure in the Senate. Often he will in-
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directly guide a compromise version that is required to settle differences
between the Senate and the House. If a bill is finally sent to the President
for signature, the lobbyist may arrange for a staunch public advocate of the
measure to approach the President on the matter. He may also cause to be sent
to the White House a flood of telegrams and letters recommending prompt and
affirmative action. If the bill is signed then the lobbyist has won his battle.
It would be wrong to assume that the lobbyist faces only the Congress
as possible barriers to success. In the cause of a legislative lobby campaign,
there are numerous lobbies at work on the same bill, or facets of it. Well
organized and vigorous lobby forces working on an issue will usually arouse
equally energetic forces on the other side of the question. In this way the
Congress is unofficially provided with a many sided research organization, for
the interplay of opposing and proposing forces brings out many facets of the
issue that would normally escape detection.
There has always existed a widespread public opinion that lobbying and
pressure group activities are confined solely to influencing the actions of
law making bodies. This opinion is unfounded in fact. It is true that pressure
groups try to obtain the passage of bills they favor, the defeat of measures
they do not endorse, and the remolding of some into acceptable form; but their
efforts do not stop at this point.
v/hen they are unsuccessful in their efforts to control or influence the
legislative process, they next concentrate their efforts on the Executive
branch. In the past it has been possible to accomplish through a favorable
interpretation of a statute what couldn't be achieved through influence in
formulating its provisions. One author quotes the authority, Pendleton Herring,
who pointed out that "when a democratic government undertakes to alleviate the
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maladjustments of the economic system, it stirs up a greed that it may lack the
power to control. The voice of the people sometimes suggests the squeal of
pigs at the trough." The executive administration in a republic is designed
and pledged to adjust the national policy in the interests of the general public
as a whole and not to the advantage of separate groups with minority interests.
According to Herring, "this concept of the public interest is a verbal symbol
designed to introduce unity, order and objectivity into administration. It is
2
to the bureaucracy what the due process clause is to the judiciary. Much of
the difficulty that the administrative agencies experience in fulfilling their
obligations is caused by the pressure groups which seek to create the impress-
ion, for the administration and the public, that their aims are identical with
those of the people in general. In many cases the interests of the minority
group actually do conform to the interests of the public. As a result the
relationship between the two is often an intricate one and adjustments are
difficult. To a large extent, the effectiveness of an official will depend on
the type of person he is. An administrative official must be familiar with the
groups with which he deals, but must take care not to become closely identified
with them. If the official is not imbued with a sincere motivation to provide
public service, his success is doubtful. He is required to solve the problems
and resolve the issues in fairness both to the public (whom he primarily
represents) and the group. He must exercise diligence to be sure he ; follows a
middle course, being neither unnecessarily adverse to the groups interests, nor
overwhelmed by their pressures. It takes strength to resist these pressures,
1
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especially when legislators become involved. It has been said that the
responsiveness of many administrative agencies to minority pressures is partly
a result of control by Congress over agency personnel and funds. For this
reason as well as future political consequences the administrator must exercise
great care in his relations with representatives of pressure groups functioning
within his agency's field of authority.
Fortunately, the judicial branch of the government is not so much subject
to pressure as the legislative and administrative departments. The courts have
always maintained a position somewhat above the sound and fury of petty politics
,
In history, the controversies over the selection of judges have been the
greatest examples of pressure politics affecting the judiciary. A good example
of this was the claim that President Roosevelt had "packed" the Supreme Court
with Justices amenable to his views. By and large any pressures exerted on
the courts are of a subtle nature. According to their particular point of
view various elements will praise or criticize the courts for various rulings
on legislative matters. Lobbyists have sought to exert pressure on the courts
through the initiation of a great hue and cry from the public when the courts
make particularly adverse rulings. History shows, nevertheless, that the
courts are not so easily swayed from the path of conscience as the other brandes
of government.
It is easily seen that there are certain benefits derived from the
existence of lobbies in a republican form of government. There is no denying
that the lobbyists provide an economic form of representation in the halls of
government, which under certain conditions can be a valuable adjunct to the
representative form of government. It has been proven and acknowledged that
the lobbyists provide a ready source of well qualified technical information
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for the legislators. Due to some staffing inadequacies in the Congress, much
information would never be revealed or considered if it were not for the efforts
of the lobbyists. In spite of this recognition of the beneficial aspects of
lobbyism there is a far stronger feeling, generally, that lobbies are in them-
selves an evil, or at least an evil due to the methods of operation employed.
It is difficult to find agreement, among students of the subject, on the issue
of to what extent the lobby system is an evil. No intelligent citizen will
deny that individuals and organisations should be allowed to present their
claims or proposed programs to the lawmaking bodies. Almost equally undeniable
is the fact that some individuals or groups, in conjunction with their lobby
agents, seek to accomplish their objectives in an above-boarci, forthright
manner. Admitting then, that the benefits derived from lobbying are not in-
significant, and that many, if not to say most, lobbyists are men of some
integrity and scruple, the question arises as to what are the evils of lobbying.
There is reasonably general agreement among students on the principal
evils extant in the lobbying system in the United States. The first of three
principal evils seems to lie in the fact that the organisations represented by
lobbies have more than their fair share of influence in shaping legislation.
Unfortunately, the general public has no effective lobby, and its interests may
be passed over when well organized groups apply pressure to congressmen. The
second often cited evil is that much of the work of the lobbies is carried on
in secret. It is feared that as a result lobbies can, and do, resort to
pressure methods that would not bear the full light of day; especially the use
of large amounts of money, placed indirectly into campaign funds, and perhaps
even bribes, for which there is no adequate accounting. The last principal
effect or evil that we will cover here is possibly the most dangerous of all.
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It is felt that the effect of the lobby system has been to undermine the faith
of the people in their government. The people become cynical in their attitude
toward representative government. People served by the lobbies come to
believe that anything can be wrested from the government if you work and howl
long enough and diligently enough. The citizen not connected with a lobby may
well come to the conclusion that he is a third class citizen, and of less con-
cern to his elected representative, than a pressure group with some cause to
further. There is widespread belief that the lobbies enter into every type of
legislative activity, and that they exert wide influence on the legislators.
There seems to be little, if any, lessening of this belief as a result of the
public disclaimers by the lawmakers. As a result of these three weaknesses of
the lobby system, it is safe to say that although mahy lobbyists neither have
base motives nor use insidious methods, the modern American lobby is an
institution to be regarded with grave concern.
The next step after the creation of a powerful institution is for the
state to attempt to control it. In our democratic form of government, the
legislators are primarily the defenders of the state. The efforts of congress
to regulate the efforts and methods of the lobbyists has resulted from its fear
of the lobbies, and from a recognition that they may acquire power to which
they are not entitled. This to be accomplished either by the lobby's repre-
sentativeness in terras of genuine membership or by the reasonableness of its
claims compared to those of the nation in general. Congress has had to steer
between prejudicing the rightful freedom of any group to approach it for a
hearing, and submitting to undue pressure for privileges. The next chapter
is concerned with a study of the way in which congress has attempted to handle
this intricate problem of navigation.

CHAPTER III
CONTROL AND REGULATION OF LOBBYING
As early as 1907 proposals to regulate lobbying were introduced in the
Congress. At sporadic intervals thereafter other half-hearted efforts were
made, but the overall effect was negligible. The seventy-fourth Congress was
besieged with bills designed to place some semblance of restraint on lobbying
activities. These intensive efforts were the direct result of the flagrant and
intensive lobbying carried on for the influencing of Utility Holding Company
legislation. As has often been the case, the two houses of the legislature
failed to come to any agreement and no general legislation on lobbying was forth
coming. Under tremendous public pressures the Congress did manage to pass the
Public Utility Holding Act of 1935. This act specifically prohibited the
utilities from contributing to campaign funds and required the registration
of all utilities lobbyists. In following years there were several bills passed
which had as their purpose preventing specific groups from lobbying, but none
of them were concerned with the regulation of lobbying in general.
The year 1946 seemed especially propitious for the enactment of a general
federal lobbying law. In this first year following the end of the Second World
War, there was an unprecedented amount of lobbying in connection with many con-
troversial questions before Congress. Among the more important of these issues
were price control, public power projects, and low cost housing for veterans.
As early as 1945 the Special Joint Committee on the Organization of




Many complaints of the attempts of organized pressure groups to influence the
decisions of the Congress were heard during the hearings of the Committee. Some
of the most vehement protests, and pleas for relief, were provided by the
legislators themselves. In its final report the Committee recommended that the
Congress enact a law that would provide for the registration of organized groups
and their agents who seek to influence legislation, and that such registrants be
required to submit statements showing the aggregate amount spent in these
activities. On the second day of August, 1946, the President signed the Legis-
lative Reorganization Act; Title III of which is the Regulation of Lobbying Act.
In order to understand the successes and failures of the Act it is
necessary to have summary knowledge of the more pertinent provisions. Section
307 of the Act defines the applicationcf the title and includes any "person"
(defined as an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, and
any other organization or group of persons) who by himself, or through any agent,
or employee, or any other persons in any way whatsoever, directly or indirectly,
solicits, collects, or receives money or any other thing to be used principally
to aid, or the principal purpose of which person is to aid in the accomplishment
of any of several purposes. These purposes include the passage or defeat of
any legislation by the Congress, to influence directly or indirectly the passage
or defeat of any legislation. Section 305 of this same Act requires that any
person receiving contributions for the purposes listed under Section 307 must
file with the Clerk of the House a statement containing the name and address of
each person who has contributed five hundred dollars or more, or any person who
has received ten dollars or more, with the date, amount and purpose of such
expenditure. Section 308 is similar to this section but more extensive. It
requires that any person who engages himself for pay or any other consideration
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for the purpose of attempting to influence the passage or defeat of any legis-
lation must register with the Secretary of the Senate as well as the Clerk of
the House. This registration must be accomplished before the agent undertakes
any lobbying activity. The registrant must state his name and business
address, the name and address of the person by whom he is employed and in
whose interest he appears or works, the duration of such employment, how much
he is paid and to receive, by whom he is paid, the extent of his expense
account, and what expenses are included in the allowance.
Section 308 contains the exemptions from the act. Among the exemptions
are: (1) Any person who merely appears before Congress in support of or
opposition to legislation; (2) any public official acting in his official
capacity; (3) any owner, publisher, or employee of a newspaper or other regu-
larly published periodical acting in the regular course of business. The act
further exempts party committeee, and all practices and activities regulated
by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. The title apparently does not apply to
organizations formed for other purposes whose efforts to influence legislation
2
are merely incidental to the purpose for which formed.'1'
Today, after the Act has been in operation for ten years, many organiza-
tions still turn to this last statement for clarification of legislative intent,
and for an explanation of the words "principally" and "principal" as used in
Section 308. These organizations base their failure to comply with the statute
upon their defining principal as "primary" or "major." Most writers on this
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tradictions and ambiguities. As a result there are organizations which have
held that they do not solicit or receive funds for the "principal purpose" of
lobbying, but who nevertheless expend money in hiring professional lobbyists.
The implementation of the act during its first year clearly demonstrated that
many organizations are holding Section 307 to be the key to the coverage of the
Act, thus exempting from the strongest provisions of the Act, organizations
whose legislative activities are not their principal concern, and who are
extremely careful not to accept funds which can be clearly shown to be earmarked
for lobbying.
Despite extensive efforts by individuals and corporations to interpret
otherwise, it is apparent that the Congress was thinking of the broad form of
application for the statute. The intention was clearly to encompass a wide
variety of pressure groups and lobbyists, and their diverse efforts at swaying
the Congress. In 1946, the Joint Committee stated HA pressure group economy
gives rise to government by whirlpools of special interest groups in which the
national welfare is often neglected. Without impairing in any way the right
of petition or freedom of expression, Senate 2177 provides for the registration
of organized groups and their agents who seek to influence legislation. Full
information regarding the membership, source of contributions, and expenditures
of organized groups would prove helpful to Congress in evaluating their
representations and weighing their worth. Publicity is a mild step forward in
protecting government under pressure and in promoting the democratization of
3
pressure groups. Clearly, the Committee endorsed the idea of full publicity.
That the lobbyists generally cared little for the committees opinion has been
clearly shown. In further defense of the "broader intent" interpretation of
3
Ibid
. . p. 5.
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Congress is the fact that the lobbying title is part of an omnibus bill dealing
with the improvement of the organization and operation of Congress, and did not
come as the result of a demand to check the lobbyist pressures on the Congress.
In any event, the many organizations supposedly covered by the Act spent great
amounts of time, energy, and money in searching out any reasons why they were
not required to register. The tax exempt organizations shied away from regis-
tration because of a clause in the revenue act that requires that an exempt
organization loses its exemption if a substantial part of its activity is con-
cerned with influencing legislation. Other organizations found similar loop-
holes and made excellent use of them.
The objections raised to the Act have been varied and many, and not a
few objections appear to have great validity. There is little doubt that the
draftsmanship was sloppy and careless. In the earliest days the Act was
criticized for its ambiguities, and newspapers made news of the fact that the
law as signed by the President held a conspicuous spelling error. Unfortunate-
ly, this did not reign long as the biggest weakness in the legislation. A wave
of protest crested over the provision of Section 308 which exempted "any public
official acting in his official capacity." Many organizations protested this
exemption, maintaining that the agencies of government spend huge sums of
public money for the purpose of influencing legislation but these agencies
and their employees were not to be considered lobbyists. This claim would
bear more weight if it were not for the fact that lobby legislation is intended
to identify the private organizations and their agents who are engaged in
lobbying. There is no denying that the agencies lobby, but the primary pur-
pose of the bill was to publicize those lobbies not so well defined. In
addition there are other means available to Congress to keep obstreperous
agencies in line. The control of funds is certainly no meagre tool.

30
There have been claims, not infrequently, that the Lobbying Act is
unconstitutional in that it violates the First Amendment. This theory has
been tested in the courts and found wanting. The regulations of the Lobby Act
can not be said to interfere with the rights of free speech, free press, or
the right of petition. The right of the people to appeal to Congress or the
Public in order to influence legislation is not denied. At most this legis-
lation can be regarded as a curb to the abuse of the right of petition, in the
same way as libel or slander laws are curbs against the rights of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press. There have also been complaints from some
factions that the Act is not extensive enough, and other factions have main-
tained that it is too extensive in its coverage.
The problems of administering the Act were many, and the violations
were beyond tabulating. In the early years of the Act, the number of individual^
and organizations that registered was minute in comparison to the hordes of
lobbyists swarming over Washington. The lobbyists were having e field day and
little was done to control them, the Act not withstanding. The administration
of the Act was in the hands of the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the
Senate, and the effectiveness of their efforts was open to question. The
burden of interpreting the Act fell upon these two officers and in many cases
this burden was handily passed on as the responsibility of the individual
registrants.
Recommendations for improving the Act have not been wanting. Doth
unofficial, impartial students and representatives of the Congress have con-
sidered the subject at great length. The impartial observers came up with vari-
ous ideas shortly after the Act had been put to the test and found deficient,
dany of these ideas were, and are, worthy of notice. Recommendations were made fojr
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broad revisions, to include the filing and coverage requirements; the centrali-
zation of administrative responsibility in an agency adequately staffed and
equipped to perform this essential function; provision for the stautory term-
ination of inactive registrations; and the specification of the exact financial
data required. One of the most highly regarded suggestions recommends the
requirement of submitting full information regarding an organization's member-
ship, internal structure, and methods of policy determination. Many students
feel strongly that the coverage of the act should be revised to apply to
lobbying before administrative agencies.
In 1951, the Buchanan Committee, & Select House Committee, was establish-
ed to investigate lobbying in the Federal System. The Committee made use of
expert witnesses in the field and uelved extensively into the present day status
of lobbying. The Committee noted that filings under the Lobby Act grossly
understated the numbers and expenditures of the pressure organizations. It
further observed that the individual registrations failed to reveal the actual
numbers of persons actively engaged in activities designed to influence the
governmental process. There is little doubt that lobbying in recent years has
become more extensive and expensive than at any other time in the nation's
history. One respected student of government has listed the top ten lobby
spenders in the first quarter of 1955. * Among the top five are found three
organizations representing utilities, and the other two represent the Auerican
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organization. It is worth
noting that many large organizations have submitted reports that are only
partially complete, and many others have not reported at all, maintaining that
4
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28, 1955 (University of Maryland, 1956), p. 22.
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they are exempted by the principal purpose clause. Other organizations repre-
sent that the registration of their agents precludes the necessity of the firms
reporting.
In its final report the Buchanan Committee made certain specific recom-
mendations for amendments to the Lobbying Act. The first recommendation was
that the word lobby be eliminated from the title of the Act. Apparently the
Committee felt that this might induce more people to comply with the law. The
next suggestion was that the radio and television services be made exempt from
the Act. This seems an excellent idea since the press and periodicals were
already exempt. The Comittee advocated the abolishment of the stipulation in
the law that barred convicted violators of the Act from appearing before Con-
gress for three years. The reasons behind this notion are difficult to grasp.
The Committee proposed that the minimum reportable expenditure be raised to
fifty dollars, in an effort to eliminate trivia, and that lobbyists receiving
less than a thousand dollars per annum be exempt from registering. The most
vigorous recommendation is one that recommends revision of the Criminal Code to
make contingent-fee lobbying illegal. In addition to this specification the
Committee had suggestions on improving the administration of the Act. One
notable idea was that standing sub-committees be established by the Administra-
tion Committees in both Houses to provide continuous analysis and evaluation
of the filings under the Lobby Act. In addition, the Committee recommended that
lobby efforts to influence administrative agencies be investigated.
The recommendations of the Committee were far from unanimous. A minority
dissented and submitted a supplementary report which differed greatly from the
majority version. The minority found fault with the conduct and methods of
the staff provided the Committee, protested the high handed tactics of the
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Chairman, and generally seemed to feel that little was actually accomplished
because the majority group was more concerned with partisan politics than it
was in digging up information. The history of lobbying investigations is
notable for the similarity of the pattern. It would be difficult to recall a
committee concerned with the subject that was not accused of playing politics
to some extent. Nothing of great note came as a result of the committee's
efforts. In June of 1955, Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts introduced a bill
into the Senate, the purpose of which is to revise and strengthen the regulation
of lobbying. The hearings are scheduled for the present session of Congress,
but whether they will be deferred in favor of the various committees set up or
reactivated since the recent campaign contribution fiasco remains to be seen.
This year may well be an interesting year in the history of lobby control efforts.
There are various ways in which the Act as it now rests can be improved
and strengthened. The registration statements of organizations should be ex-
panded to include concrete evidence of actual membership; how the organization
establishes its lobbying policies; and by what right the lobbyist speaks for the
group. One of the most effective potential powers of the Law is the power to
publicize. Provision should be made for the widest possible circulation in a
simplified and intelligible form of the information revealed on registration
statements and financial reports. The reports should be made available to
press and broadcasting services, and publicized widely. The Act could best be
administered, in my opinion, by a separate group set up for the purpose. This
group could investigate the accuracy of statements filed and the compliance of
those to whom the Act applies. The findings of this group could be made
effective through the use of wide publicity.
Despite the apparent failure of the Lobbying Act, and despite its glaring

34
weaknesses, the Act is still a step in the right direction. It is ridiculous
to expect that it would have been letter perfect in effectiveness, anymore than
it was expected that the Legislative Budget would be an unqualified success.
The Act, it is to be hoped, will be revamped and revitalized with an eye
toward greater effectiveness. As long as most legislation is proposed and
opposed by minority interests it is vital that these interests be identified.
Only through requiring the various interests to stand and show themselves and
their activities can the general public be assured that there is no conspiracy
shared by the special interest parties and the people's elected representatives.
The citizens of the country have displayed a good deal of contempt in the past
for some of the activities of their elected servants. They have displayed even
more contempt for the unwillingness of the colleagues of offending legislators
to do anything about their erring brothers. Not all of this contempt is un-
justified, as history clearly shows. The belief and trust of the majority of
the citizens in the integrity of their legislators is basic to the success of
a republican government. If a modified lobby law can serve to strengthen this
faith and confidence of the people, it should be championed, and made effective
despite any petty politicians and pressure agents who may stand in the way.
^For an excellent discussion of this subject see H. Hubert Wilson,
Congress: Corruption and Compromise
, (New York: Rinehart, 1951).

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS AND THE FUTURE
One thing may be said to stand out from past experiences and recent
investigations, and though it is not an original discovery it bears repetition.
The modern day system of pressure politics through lobbying has assumed extra-
ordinary proportions in recent years, and is now assumed by many not to be a
total evil, but rather an important and necessary ingredient of our democracy.
There is every reason to believe that if it is unchecked the system will
expand to far greater size in the future. Some students of the subject feel
that it may eventually challenge the existence of representative government as
understood in the terms of our Constitution. At the same time, many of these
same observers feel that the Constitutional right of petition must be preserved
and that no restriction should be put upon "legitimate" lobbying. In 1951, the
Buchanan Committee recognized this conflict and concluded that it was one of
the most pressing problems facing the lawmakers.
We have seen the limited effectiveness enjoyed by the only Act specifi-
cally designed to control all lobbying. Recommendations for improvement of the
Act are many, varied, and easily come by. Adoption of certain specific revisions;
and additions would, in my opinion, put greater strength and effectiveness into
the Act.
U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, General
Interim Report
. H. R. 3138, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government






Thoughtful observers must question whether any legislative act, though
far stronger than the one now in force, is the ultimate answer to the problem
of pressures in the governmental process. It is true that more adequate regu-
lation of lobbyism will bring more light upon the methods and activities of thes£
organizations and their agents, but no legislation will change the basic aims
or nature of lobbying. The feelings of more than a few students are reflected
in a statement by Ogg, "But mere outward compliance with the rules, even if
assured by more adequate machinery of enforcement than now exists, does not
necessarily render lobbyist activities less predatory; and it is difficult to
see how ill effects can be obviated except as Congress finds ways to stiffen
members' resistance, e.g., by making them less dependent upon the information
with which the lobbyists too often overwhelm them."^
This, then, is another possible answer to the problem of lobby power.
Give the Congress more adequate staff assistance and they will be free of the
lobbies and their pressures. The supporters of the theory that maintains
Congressmen bend to the will of the lobbies because they can't obtain informa-
tion in any other way are legion. LaFollette wrote, "Lobbying may be a per-
nicious evil at one extreme or an indispensable part of the legislative process
at the other, depending on the circumstances and the methods of the lobbyists.
Few, if any, legislators would hold a brief for the avaricious, anti-social, or
unscrupulous tactics to which some special interests sometimes resort; but even
fewer would be willing to abolish lobbying and cut off essential sources of in-
formation in exchange for "protection" against the unscrupulous."4 There is
3
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some good evidence that Congress has need of better and fuller staffing service,
but to maintain that all the Congressmen that have ever taken a bribe, compro-
mised with their consciences, or betrayed the confidences of their constituents
did so because they didn't have adequate staffs exceeds the credibility of the
most gullible.
There is another school of thought that argues that the lobbies are
hopelessly evil and should be legislated right out of existence. The State of
Georgia made lobbying illegal many years ago, but there are reasons to doubt
that lobbies are no longer active there. I hold very little brief with the
idea of outlawing the lobbies. I don't think lobbying can be effectively out-
lawed under our Constitution, nor do I think such a course would be desirable,
even if it were practical.
In a factually free society pressure groups seem both inevitable and
desirable. It is the activities of the groups, their methods, and the amount
of success they attain that is the question of concern. Too great a success by
any interest will cause other groups to rise up and energetically seek favors.
In his inaugural address as President of Columbia University, Dwight Eisenhower
declared, "If we do not eliminate selfish abuse of power by any one group, we
5
can be certain that equal retaliation by other groups will ensue." That
people are very concerned with getting "their share" is not a new discovery.
Today, unfortunately, the people regard the government as a huge feed bag, and
are eager to get their muzzles in. The success of lobbies begets still more
lobbies.
Agreeing with most recognized authorities that the lobbies are here to
,
5
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stay, the problem facing the people of this country is how to best limit the
lobbies* sphere of influence. There is no denying, except by some legislators
attempting to impress their constituents, that the lobbies through their diversi-
fied activities exert considerable influence in the governing of the country.
Accepting the idea that the principle behind lobbying and the services it
renders justify its existence, we are presented with the problem of lessening
the evil effects which result from the lobbies existence.
In line with this limitation there have been espoused two theories, both
of which ignore the idea of control through legislation, and both of which re-
quire radical departures from our present system of government. It has been
suggested very often, but seldom with any clear outline for practical imple-
mentation, that the government should support the interests which do not have
adequate resources, so that they may contend on an equal basis with groups that
are well supplied with funds. This idea was thoroughly examined in 1941 by a
member of the Temporary National Economic Committee. The basic flaws in such
a proposal are readily apparent. This device might help to solve the temporary
imbalance between groups, but this partial good would be quickly counteracted
by more pressure, rather than less, on policy making. A second large flaw is
that it would be literally impossible to select any reasonable criteria on
which to base the level of suprort to be afforded the various groups.
The second theory embraces the often tried idea cf providing occupational
representation in the legislature. Some students feel that if occupational and
professional groups were given representation, lobbying would disappear since
all economic interests would be represented. This program would require changes
Donald C. Blaisdell, Investigation of the Concentration of Economic
Power
.
A Report to the Seventy-Fifth Congress. Prepared by the Temporary
National Economic Committee (W shington, 1941).
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in the Constitution that would provide for some representatives to be elected
by occupational constituencies. This reform is not likely to ever see the light
of day, nor would it put a stop to lobbying. Once represented these groups
would suffer internal fractures whenever certain elements of the group felt
they were not being equitably considered in the general group program, and
new lobbies would spring up to press their claims. The basic spirit of lobbying
is based on a singular devotion and service to some separate segment of a
business or activity which is too narrow to be allowed a group representation
in the legislative bodies. The legislature would be little more than a horde
of special interests fighting constantly for special economic privileges.
I certainly feel that more exact, and strictly enforced, legislation
will do a great deal in controlling the methods and devices of the lobbies.
These improved regulations should be regarded as a stop gap only. No law is
ever going to be a panacea for the ills inherent in the lobby system as we
know it in the United States. Efforts to control lobbying in the past have
always bogged down due largely to the partisan tactics employed by the members
of the Congress. These men have been vociferous in berating the lobbies and
their methods, but the same men have been sadly lacking in spirit when unity
and inter-party action was necessary to do something constructive.
I think the power of the lobbies can be controlled, and controlled within
the framework of the Constitution as it now exists. Theories recommending
occupational representation or federal support of impecunious lobbies provide
materials for writing texts but are largely impractical and unnecessary. As
I've already stated I view strong regulatory measures as only a stop gap, to
be used until better methods are contrived.
In my opinion, the most potentially effective tool for limiting the powers
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of the lobbies consists of stronger political parties, and greater and more
effective party discipline. Our political system is so constructed that only
with this strong party discipline can it function to the best interest of all
concerned. Experience has shown that when party leadership and sense of
responsibility are weakest is the time when the lobbies enjoy their greatest
opportunities and exert the greatest influence in government. Whenever the
parties have failed to assume and maintain leadership of the people, the
pressure groups have moved in and assumed the lead by default. Strong party
platforms and programs, and a determination to carry them out through disci-
plined party action, with the parties taking definite stands on current
problems and living up to their commitments to their members would considerably
relieve the threat of government by pressure.
Earlier in our history, political parties were established on certain
beliefs of their members. The parties were said to stand for something. Today
the tendency is for all parties to stand for everything. As they operate today,
the parties change their views and beliefs as readily as the chameleon does its
color. Within the parties there is next to no discipline at all. It is common
for a legislator to change parties from election to election. This is easily
done because the distinction between the parties is very small. They may vary
their emphasis from year to year, but the idea is still to present a program
that will apply equally to all sections of the country and all economic inter-
ests. The parties suffer from a severe lack of leadership within themselves.
It is no wonder then, that they are no longer able to control their candidates
nor lead the people.
It should be possible for the major parties to establish basic platforms
that are distinct. These platforms should further provide a balance of economic
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power and interests between the parties. With this platform established, and
coupleu with a determination to adhere to it, the parties should present can-
didates to the electorate who are wholly in agreement with the platform and
who possess the requisite loyalty to further the platform. Two strong parties,
emphasizing contrasting views and beliefs will provide a buttle of competing
interests in the two constitutional houses, and as a result will relegate the
Third House to the role of an adjunct, not the policy forming arena of our
national government. The lobbies will still serve valuable purposes in making
the desires of the minority known, and in providing excellent sources of
technical information. At the same time legislators will not be easily swayed
since they will realize that concessions granted contrary to the party beliefs
will result in party retaliation seriously affecting their legislative longevity
Mechanical measures for controlling the methods of the lobbyists, and
widespread publicity of lobby activites, coupled with strong leadership in the
political parties and supported by the people through the intelligent and united
use of the still powerful ballot are the likely tools for lifidting the effective
ness of pressure groups within our governmental framework. In the very final
analysis it is only through the efforts of an intelligently aroused citizenry
that the government established in the Constitution can be maintained and made
to represent the people as a whole. It is primarily the indifference of the
unorganized voters, fostered by the diminishing stature of the party politicians
that has allowed pressure group government to get as firmly established as it
is. By the same token, it will require the actions of these same citizens lead
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'i ..— . Received for services (e. g., salary,
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